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THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN 
SINGAPORE 
 
by WARREN B. CHIK* 
 
The Singapore dispute resolution landscape entered the new millennium with the reconstruction 
of the dual carriageway for arbitration. In 2002, the old road to arbitral resolution of disputes 
( , the old Arbitration Act and the old International Arbitration Act) were reconstructed and what 
emerged were two updated legislations: the Arbitration Act and the International Arbitration Act. At 
about the same time, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) also diversified with 
the introduction of a new set of Domestic Arbitration Rules in 2001 to complement its 
previously singular set of Arbitration Rules of 1991, which were formulated mainly for the 
conduct of international arbitration. Where the legislative architects and the executive planners 
had gone, judicial lawmakers soon followed suit. By 2002, the Singapore judiciary had had about 
ten years of experience in the introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms 
into the Singapore legal system.1 It was no surprise that it would embrace arbitration as a viable 
alternative to litigation. As arbitral issues exponentially arose with greater frequency in the courts, 
so were court resources allocated to the development of Singapore’s own body of arbitration 
law. This paper introduces the reader to the current arbitration regime in Singapore with a 
general introduction to the policy and legislative developments in the area followed by an incisive 
look at significant judicial decisions that have developed in the years after the Acts were 
introduced. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The Holistic Approach and Triumvirate Support for Arbitration 
 
1. The First Pillar: Government Policy and Legislation 
 
In 2002, Singapore reconstructed its dual-track arbitration law and system into a highway for 
domestic and international arbitral disputes.2 In the new millennium, in line with its policy of 
diversification, the Singapore government has looked beyond the goals of achieving 
transportation, finance and technology hub status, by accelerating its efforts in developing 
Singapore as a trade, education, and private dispute resolution centre as well. The groundwork 
was laid a decade ago when the government fostered the establishment of the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) in July 1991 followed by the enactment of the 
International Arbitration Act2 in 1994, which incorporated the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
                                                  
* The author is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Law in the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
the Singapore Management University. He has an LLB from the National University of Singapore, an LLM in 
International Business Law from University College London and an LLM in International & Comparative Law 
(Dist.) from Tulane University. He is a certified lawyer in Singapore, the State of New York and England & 
Wales. 
1 See Asanthi Mendis, Marvin Bay & Shobha G. Nair, “The Integration of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
within the Subordinate Courts’ Adjudication Process” (2004) 16 Sing. Ac. L.J. 501. 
2 See Lawrence Boo, The Law and Practice of Arbitration in Singapore (Workshop IV Paper III) (Singapore: 
ASEAN Law Association, December 2003). 
2 Cap. 143A, 1994 Sing.  
Commercial Arbitration.3 In 2002, the dual-track approach was revamped with the coming into 
force of the new Arbitration Act4 (AA) (replacing the old Arbitration Act5) and an amended 
International Arbitration Act6 (IAA). 
 
Those moves were part of a conscious effort by the Singapore government to promote the use 
of arbitration to resolve domestic disputes, as well as to promote Singapore as a forum or seat of 
arbitration for the resolution of international disputes by local and foreign parties involved in 
international, and largely commercial, transactions. The government also led by example, 
accepting or incorporating arbitration clauses into some of its own international, regional and 
bilateral agreements and domestic contracts. 
 
2. The Second Pillar: Executive and Institutional Support  
 
The SIAC was set up as Singapore’s answer to other well-known arbitral institutions, such as the 
International Court of Arbitration in Paris set up by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), to name but a few. Its purpose is to promote arbitration as a viable 
alternative to litigation and to attract foreign “arbitrants” to Singapore.  As with the above-
mentioned institutions, the SIAC provides a full range of services and facilities for both 
international and domestic arbitration for a fee, including administrative and logistical support as 
well as depository services. It is also the statutory appointing authority for arbitrators under the 
IAA, and maintains a panel of accredited arbitrators from around the world from which 
appointments can be made. Last but not least, the SIAC administers the cases before it under its 
own Rules of Arbitration while not confining itself to administering arbitrations only under 
those Rules. 
 
3. The Third Pillar: The Judiciary and Developments in Case Law 
 
The courts have since followed suit in placing importance on, and encouraging the development 
of the law and rules for the arbitral process. It is a sign of how important arbitration law and 
practice has become to the Singapore system of dispute resolution that three High Court Justices 
were specially appointed to oversee the development of Singapore’s case law jurisprudence in 
the field of arbitration. On 1 November 2004, Chief Justice Yong Pung How appointed Justice 
Belinda Ang and Justice V. K. Rajah to join Justice Judith Prakash (appointed earlier on 7 April 
2003) to hear arbitration matters brought before the High Court. They will hear all High Court 
applications arising from arbitration proceedings made under the AA and the IAA.  
 
This was a move in anticipation of the increase in such applications relating to, amongst others, 
evidential discovery, jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal, challenges to arbitrator appointments, 
and the enforcement of arbitral awards. The media release explicitly noted that the appointments 
were made with the intention of creating a group of judges in the High Court with a depth of 
expertise and experience in arbitration matters, to enable the High Court to hear the increasing 
                                                  
3 Adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985 as United Nations 
document A/40/17, Annex I. 
4 Cap. 10, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing. 
5 Cap. 10, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing. 
6 Cap. 143A, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing.  
volume of arbitration matters quickly and efficiently, and more significantly, with a view to 
supporting Singapore’s efforts in promoting herself as the location of choice for commercial 
arbitration in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 
 
B. The Buildup of Arbitration Jurisprudence in the Courts 
 
Concomitant with that move, disputes containing arbitration issues continue to arise in the 
courts with greater frequency, particularly those relating to jurisdictional challenges to the 
tribunal, the removal of arbitrators and the setting aside of awards. From this pool of cases, 
there recently arose some illuminating decisions on Singapore’s stance on certain issues of 
interest.7 These include matters relating to confidentiality in arbitration (which has not been 
consistently applied around the world) and whether an ambiguous reference to a set of arbitral 
rules in a contract can lead to the incorporation of a subsequent set of rules (and when it is 
appropriate to do so). Generally, where there is already jurisprudence in English law, our courts 
appear, both in form and spirit, to toe the line with the English decisions. 
 
Notably and unsurprisingly, in terms of context, we see that the bulk of arbitral issues brought 
before the courts involved construction and commercial disputes. 
 
The general tenor of the cases continue to bear out the policy that the arbitration process and 
the arbitrator’s authority should be respected to the extent agreed upon by the parties; and that 
the grounds for removal of the arbitrator and the bases for arbitral decisions to be set aside 
should be limited and stringent.8 They also respect the “spirit and scheme of arbitration”, which 
                                                  
7 In fact, judges have taken care to consider arbitration issues even if it was “academic”, and often took the 
effort to canvass arbitration jurisprudence of other common law countries and local precedents (whether ratio or 
obiter) to explain or support the position to be taken in Singapore.7 They also sought to explain arbitral concepts 
and the differences between the arbitration process and functionaries on the one hand, and other forms of 
dispute resolution on the other. For example, the judge in Evergreat Construction Co Pte Ltd v Presscrete 
Engineering Pte Ltd, [2005] SGHC 224, went into detail in explaining the differences between expert 
determination and arbitration. For instance, a fundamental difference is in the procedure and in the absence of 
remedies for procedural irregularity in expert determination. Also, an expert’s determinations  are enforceable as 
contractual bargains both inside and outside the jurisdiction. His decisions can only be set aside if his terms of 
appointment is breached or for fraud or partiality. Another notable difference is that an expert can (and is often 
expected to) use and apply his personal expertise and to make his own inquiries without any obligation to seek 
other views, and is also not obliged to make a decision on the basis of the evidence presented to him (i.e. he can 
act based on his subjective opinion). However, the final scope of the power, duties and functions of both the 
expert and the arbitrators is still to be determined by the parties under their terms of appointment [ibid. at paras. 
33-39].  
8 See Yee Hong Pte Ltd v Powen Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd, [2005] 3 Sing.L.R. 512; [2005] SGHC 114, a 
domestic arbitration case, where an action for the removal of the arbitrator failed despite allegations of improper 
conduct and excess exercise of power under sections 16(1)(b) and 22 of the AA and Articles 5.1 and 12.1(c) of 
the applicable arbitration rules respectively. For instance, removal due to “improper conduct” was subject to the 
high threshold requirement that it had caused “substantial injustice”, which in this case the applicant failed to 
surmount. Mere loss of confidence was insufficient a basis. The judge also affirmed the arbitrator’s “wide 
discretion in reaching his decisions as to what the duty of acting fairly demanded in the circumstances of a 
given case.” [ibid. at paras. 25 to 26]. See also, Permasteelisa Pacific Holdings Ltd v Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Co Ltd, [2005] 2 Sing.L.R. 270; [2005] SGHC 33, a domestic arbitration case. The outcome of 
this case was mixed. On several of the appellant’s complaints in its application for various reliefs, the judge 
held that the arbitrator had not misconducted himself, but on others that he did. For example, in relation to 
matters relating to and based upon the arbitrator’s findings of fact, the arbitrator’s findings were conclusive. On 
the other hand, however, the arbitrator was found to have misconducted himself on other matters including the 
is based upon the parties’ choice and the independence of the arbitration process and the arbitral 
tribunal.9 
 
As already noted, there are the usual cases on issues relating to applicable law,10 stay of court 
proceedings for arbitration,11 jurisdiction of the tribunal, scope, coverage, reach, and 
incorporation by reference of arbitration clauses,12 challenges of arbitrator,13 interim measures,14 
                                                                                                                                                        
omission to give reasons for his conclusions and for adopting the wrong method of computation and those 
matters was thus remitted to the arbitrator for consideration. The judge in this case reaffirmed that established 
principle that arbitral awards cannot be set aside on the basis of a mistake or error of fact alone and that it did 
not constitute misconduct for the purposes of the AA. However, leave to appeal can be given for the 
determination of questions of law for domestic arbitration, which “would add to the clarity and certainty of 
Singapore law.” [ibid. at para. 71]. See also the Dexia Bank case at Note 90, an international arbitration case. 
9 See the Woh Hup case at Note 120 at para. 36. The court found that it was unnecessary on the facts of the case 
to consider if it had the jurisdiction to order pre-arbitral discovery (whether as an inherent power or under the 
Rules of Court). However, it appeared to doubt that there was such a power on the basis that matters submitted 
to arbitration should be dealt with first by the arbitral tribunal with the court stepping in only to the extent that 
its assistance is required and sanctioned by law.  
10 See Jurong Engineering Ltd. v. Black and Veatch Singapore Pte. Ltd. [2004] 1 Sing.L.R. 333 and the appeal 
in Black and Veatch Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Engineering Ltd. [2004] 4 Sing.L.R. 19 (examined in greater 
detail below). 
11 E.g., in The Body Shop (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Winmax Investment Pte. Ltd. and Another (Obayashi 
Corporation and Others, Third Parties) [2004] SGDC 73, the respondent argued against a stay of the court 
proceedings under section 6 of the AA on two bases; first, that the appellant had taken a step in proceedings and 
was no longer entitled to a stay, and second, that a stay would give rise to undesirable multiplicity of actions 
(which would be good enough reason or sufficient cause within the meaning of section 6(2)(a) of the Act for the 
judge to exercise her discretion against granting a stay). The judge was persuaded to exercise her discretion. 
12 E.g., in Chin Leong Construction Systems Pte. Ltd. (formerly known as Chin Leong Construction Pte. Ltd.) v. 
Kin Lin Builders Pte. Ltd. [2004] SGDC 143, the District Court judge had to consider, on the facts, whether an 
arbitration clause under a main construction contract was incorporated by reference into a sub-contract. She 
examined the authorities presented by the parties and summarised the rule as being a question of construction of 
the contract. She found that the parties did indeed have the intention to incorporate under the facts of the case as 
the incorporation was sufficiently specific, and the parties’ intention to incorporate was clear. On the separate 
question of the grant of a stay in favour of arbitration, the judge held that once the arbitration clause is proven, 
the burden of proof fell on the opposing party to show cause against allowing a stay.  In exercising its discretion, 
the court followed the approach of the court in Kwan Im Tong Chinese Temple v. Fong Choon Hung 
Construction Pte. Ltd. [1998] 2 Sing.L.R. 137, by assessing, in a holistic manner, whether there was a dispute 
before concluding that there indeed was one. 
13 E.g., in Anwar Siraj and Another v. Ting Kang Chung and Another [2003] 2 Sing.L.R. 287, Tay Yong Kwang 
J. dealt with an application for the removal of an arbitrator from a construction arbitration on a plethora of 
grounds including lack of diligence, incompetence, inexperience and bias. The statutory bases for the challenge 
were “misconduct” and a failure of “reasonable despatch” under sections 17 and 18 of the old AA. Although the 
bases are worded differently under sections 14 and 16 of the new AA and Articles 12 and 14 of the Model Law 
applicable through the IAA (which uses the test of, inter alia, “justifiable doubts as to [an arbitrator’s] 
impartiality or independence” as well as failure to “properly conduct the proceedings”/“perform his functions” 
or to “use all reasonable despatch”/“act without undue delay”), the general considerations are still instructive as 
to the treatment judges will give to such challenges and the factors that they will consider. The judge held that 
“misconduct” occurs where there is a mishandling of the arbitration amounting to “substantial miscarriage of 
justice” (notably made a precondition under section 16 of the new AA under the modified phrase - “substantial 
injustice”). That is a question of fact and degree depending upon the circumstances of the case, and to be 
determined by the application of an objective reasonable person test to determine the “real likelihood” of 
injustice. A subjective perception, an erroneous finding of law or fact, or procedural errors, does not amount to 
misconduct per se [ibid. at para. 40 to 41 and 43]. As for “reasonable despatch”, it is also a question of fact and 
degree [ibid.  at para. 45]. Following the general trend, the judge emphasised that “the Court’s supervisory role 
is to be exercised with a light hand” and the arbitrator remains the master of his own procedure and has wide 
setting aside of awards, and even appeals on questions of law.15 Only those which contain new 
jurisprudence, particularly those addressing novel issues, and which will be of particular legal 
interest, will be considered in greater detail below. 
 
C. Relevance of Singapore Case Law to International and Domestic Arbitrations 
 
It is in the nature of arbitration that the parties’ agreement largely determines the law (and the 
rules) applicable to the agreement and to the proceedings. Arbitrations are not held in a vacuum 
and where a situs is chosen, as is usually the case, the laws of the lex arbitri, be it in the form of 
codes or statutes and case law, will determine how such arbitrations and its related issues should 
be treated. Parties who choose to hold their arbitration proceedings in Singapore subject those 
proceedings to her laws unless they expressly select the laws of another country, which is rare.  
 
As Singapore has a dual-track approach to arbitration, domestic and international,16 it is 
important for potential “arbitrants” to know which statutory regime is applicable,17 and what the 
laws mean to their agreement, for the arbitral proceedings, and to the award which follows. 
Thus, it is no less important for, say, a French, Moroccan or Korean party to know what 
Singapore arbitration law means to him than a Singaporean party when there is an arbitration 
agreement for them to resolve their disputes in Singapore. Hence, the development of the law in 
this area by the court’s growing pool of decisions is welcome, whether as a clarification of the 
law (for certainty and predictability) or to establish the law in relation to a novel issue that has 
come before the courts.  
 
Briefly, the relevance of these cases extends to both domestic and international arbitration, as 
some of them illustrate and distinguish the differences between both regimes and the 
importance of good drafting of an arbitration agreement or clause so as to clearly and explicitly 
assert the parties’ choice of law (the Acts allow for party autonomy in their selection of 
                                                                                                                                                        
discretionary powers. He dismissed the motion on the facts of the case. See also, Koh Brothers Building and 
Civil Engineering Contractor Pte. Ltd. v. Scotts Development (Saraca) Pte. Ltd.  [2002] 4 Sing.L.R. 748. 
14 E.g. in Econ Corp. International Ltd. v. Ballast-Nedam International BV [2003] 2 Sing.L.R. 15, Lai Kew 
Chai J. affirmed the power of the arbitral tribunal under section 12 of the IAA to grant interim measures 
including interlocutory injunctions and mareva-type injunctions, which are powers exercisable by the High 
Court in support of an arbitration. In this case, it was even used as the basis for the grant of leave to serve an 
originating summons out of jurisdiction which seeks a grant of an injunction against the calling upon a bond and 
advance payment guarantees given for a contract calling for arbitration in another country (i.e., India, where the 
plaintiffs commenced arbitration proceedings). This is consistent with the reading of Article 1(2) read with 
Article 9 of the Model Law. 
15 See Liew Ter Kwang v. Hurry General Contractor Pte. Ltd. [2004] 3 Sing.L.R. 59 and Northern Elevator 
Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd. v. United Engineers (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (No. 2) [2004] 2 Sing.L.R. 494 (examined 
in greater detail below). 
16 Arbitration is “international” if the parties to the arbitration are of different nationalities or the subject matter 
of the dispute involves a State other than the State in which the parties are nationals. An international arbitration 
may have no connection whatsoever with the State in which the arbitration is being held except for the process 
taking place there. See also Article 1(3) of the Model Law, which is applicable in Singapore via section 3(1) 
and the First Schedule of the IAA. 
17 Ibid. on the applicability of the IAA. The AA does not contain any provision on its scope of application. It 
applies to all arbitrations that come under Singapore law, which do not come under the ambit of the IAA. The 
IAA allows parties to “opt out”, but not the AA, although parties to what would otherwise be a domestic 
arbitration can “opt in” to the IAA regime or expressly provide their own rules to govern the arbitral proceedings 
that will apply in lieu of the AA’s implied rules. 
arbitration law),18 and other cases establish the stance of the Singapore courts on issues relevant 
to both domestic and international regimes, which is especially important since Singapore 
severed ties with the English Privy Council and indicated its intention to develop an independent 
body of law. These may relate to the interpretation of provisions common to both statutes, or 
relate to matters unlegislated and belonging to the common law domain. 19  
 
II. THE BODY OF DECISIONS 
 
A. Singapore Builds its Case Law Database 
 
It is not surprising that most of the emerging case law consider issues relating to the two most 
disputed areas in arbitration law, namely, the existence, applicability or scope of an arbitration 
provision and the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, which determines the legitimacy of an 
arbitration,20 as well as the reviewability and enforceability (or otherwise) of an arbitral award, 
which determines the outcome of the case.21  
                                                  
18 Ibid. at Note 4. 
19 For example, the recent case of Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co. Ltd. v. Win Win Nu and Another 
[2003] 2 Sing.L,R, 547 addressed for the first time Singapore’s stance on confidentiality in arbitration, which is 
neither sufficiently addressed under the statutes nor the institutional rules, and the degree of which varies from 
country to country. 
20 An example is the 30 September 2004 judgment by Lai Siu Chiu J. in the case of Sintal Enterprise Pte. Ltd. v. 
Multiplex Constructions Pty. Ltd. [2004] 4 Sing.L.R. 841. In that case, the judge had to consider whether there 
was a “dispute” referable to arbitration. She referred to section 6 of the AA as well as the previous Court of 
Appeal cases of SA Shee & Co. (Pte.) Ltd. v. Kaki Bukit Industrial Park Pte. Ltd. [2000] 2 Sing.L.R. 12 (which 
held that the answer to the question whether a dispute fell within an arbitration clause in a contract depends on 
what the dispute was and what disputes the clause covered) and Kwan Im Tong Chinese Temple v. Fong Choon 
Hung Construction Pte. Ltd. [1998] 2 Sing.L.R. 137 (which held that the court should adopt a “holistic and 
common-sense approach” to determine if there was a dispute for purposes of an arbitration clause) [ibid. at para. 
25]. It was finally determined, on the facts, that the matter did not fall within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. Another example is a case which was heard almost exactly a year previously, on 10 September 
2003, by Tan Lee Meng J. in Teck Guan Sdn. Bhd. v. Beow Guan Enterprises Pte. Ltd. [2003] 4 Sing.L.R. 276, 
the judge had to consider if the clause, “any dispute of this contract to be governed by the rules of the Cocoa 
Merchants’ Association of America Inc (CMAA)”, required the parties to refer their disputes to the CMAA to 
be resolved. The judge found that the clause was too vague and ambiguous, and did not make it clear that the 
parties agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration much less one by the CMAA. Factors which led him to that 
conclusion included the fact that the parties were not members of CMAA whose rules did not mandate their use 
of its arbitration processes (hence no incorporation by reference), and the fact that it was only after two years 
that the appellants sought arbitration under the CMAA. See also, Mae Engineering Ltd. v. Dragages Singapore 
Pte. Ltd. [2002] 3 Sing.L.R. 45. 
21 A straightforward case on the question of the setting aside of an arbitral award under section 24(b) of the IAA 
(additional grounds for setting aside to those under Article 34 of the Model Law) was Luzon Hydro Corp. v. 
Transfield Philippines Inc [2004] 4 Sing.L.R. 705. In this case, the applicant who was dissatisfied with the 
award in favour of the respondent took out an application to set it aside pursuant to section 24(b). The grounds 
of the application were that the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties and 
that a breach of the rules of natural justice had occurred in the making of the award. The judge rightly held that 
under the Act, there was no appeal against the merits of an arbitral proceeding. As such, the applicant’s 
argument that the tribunal had failed to make certain findings or had failed to consider its defences properly 
could not be grounds for setting aside the award. On the facts, the allegations of the expert witness’ partiality 
and of him over-stepping his bounds as well as of the tribunal’s abdication of decision-making to him were not 
found to be proven. Implicit in the judgement was the awareness that it was common for an unsuccessful party 
to an arbitration to try to set aside awards, hence, as in the cases before it, the integrity and independence of the 
The outcomes of these cases are usually determined on the facts. But there are still some cases 
which deal with more interesting, sometimes novel legal issues, and it is these to which we shall 
now turn our attention. 
 
B. Construction of Arbitration Clauses 
 
1. Applicable Law, Applicable Rules 
 
In Jurong Engineering Ltd. v. Black and Veatch Singapore Pte. Ltd.,22 the parties, both of which were 
companies incorporated in Singapore, had entered into a construction contract containing an 
arbitration clause. Differences arose and the plaintiffs issued a notice of arbitration. The 
arbitration was commenced under the SIAC Domestic Rules to which the defendants objected. 
The issue turned on the meaning of the sentence under the arbitration clause which stated that: 
“Any arbitration will be conducted in English in Singapore under and in accordance with the 
rules of arbitration promulgated by the Singapore International Arbitration Center.” Did it mean 
the rules at the time of contracting or at the time of submission of the dispute to arbitration?  
 
The significance was that if it was the former, the old SIAC Rules would have been applicable, 
but if it was the latter, the SIAC Domestic Rules (which were developed in the interim period) 
would have been applicable.  
 
Lai Kew Chai J. in the High Court adopted a two-step approach in the interpretation of the 
clause. He first looked at whether the words used were general or specific. That is, were they 
clearly referring to the old SIAC Rules or were they too generally worded and need not have so 
referred. He decided that the words were used generally.23 The judge then gave the clause its 
“natural and ordinary meaning”, which was taken to be referring to the “most appropriate 
institutional rules existing at the time of the submission”. Thus, the parties were not confined to 
the old (or even existing) rules, but whichever were most relevant when a dispute is submitted to 
arbitration should be applicable. He held that the SIAC Domestic Rules applied. 
 
The defendants appealed against his decision to the Court of Appeal in Black and Veatch Singapore 
Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Engineering Ltd.,24 which upheld the lower court decision and the judge’s 
reasoning. The judges noted that the repercussion of which Rules applied was that it would also 
determine whether the Arbitration Act was applicable or the International Arbitration Act was 
applicable,25 with their different standards of operation.26 
                                                                                                                                                        
tribunal should only be disproved by strong and clear evidence, otherwise arbitral awards will lose their effect if 
they are easily set aside by the courts [ibid. at paras. 17 to 18]. 
22 [2004] 1 Sing.L.R. 333. 
23 The model clause set out in the SIAC Rules made specific reference to the full title of the SIAC Rules. As the 
parties in this case did not use the full title, this omission was a factor taken against the defendant’s contention 
that the clause “stood still” at the time of contracting [ibid. at para. 12]. 
24 [2004] 4 Sing.L.R. 19. 
25 Ibid. at para. 8. This was a curious statement by the court and may cause some confusion. It is clearly stated 
under section 15(2) of the IAA that “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, a provision in an arbitration agreement 
referring to or adopting any rules of arbitration shall not of itself be sufficient to exclude the application of the 
Model Law or this Part to the arbitration concerned”. Section 15(1) of the Act further states that if the parties 
expressly excluded the Model Law or that Act, then the domestic AA or the old (repealed) Act (if applicable) 
would apply by default. The mirror-image of this is section 3 of the AA, which states that it “shall apply to any 
arbitration where the place of arbitration is Singapore and where Part II of the IAA does not apply to that 
 
They felt that there was a prima facie inference that where rules were mainly procedural, the rules 
in force at the time of commencement of the arbitration would apply.27 The fact that the SIAC 
Domestic Rules were a different set, rather than a different version, of the SIAC Rules existing 
at the time of contracting was not important, being “only a distinction of form rather than 
substance”. 
 
The significance of this case was that it did not draw a distinction between different versions of 
the same set of institutional rules and different sets of rules. Hence, if the parties leave their 
choice of rules produced by an arbitral institution open-ended, then they are taken to have 
accepted any amendments to existing rules, and even new rules, which are adjudged to be more 
appropriate to the parties and the dispute at hand. This was an extension of the existing English 
case law which only dealt with the issue of the applicability of changes to existing rules, not 
entirely new rules.28 
 
Hence, it is important for the parties to an arbitration provision to state their intentions clearly 
and specifically to avoid ambiguity, and to avoid the possibility of a different version, or even a 
different set, of rules (which were not within their contemplation) becoming applicable to their 
dispute, particularly when the differences in the rules may lead to unforeseen or unwanted 
repercussions. Referring to the full title of a set of rules, perhaps even stating that it should be 
the rules at the date of contracting (or as of any other date) will remove any ambiguities and 
effectively incorporate the selected rules. 
 
2. Interpretation of Arbitration Clauses 
 
Closely related to the issues surrounding the construction of arbitration provisions are the ever 
prominent questions as to their scope and coverage, which often surface as the basis for 
jurisdictional challenges. Applications for stay in this regard are thus related to the larger issue of 
jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                                        
arbitration”. Hence, a choice of rules, or a lack of choice thereof, should not prima facie determine the 
applicable law (unless it can be argued that it clearly evidences a preference of the domestic over the 
international, or vice versa). In fact, the rules by which the arbitration will be conducted are determined by the 
Act which applies, unless the parties clearly and explicitly stipulate in the arbitration agreement itself a 
particular set of rules, in which case, the contractually agreed-upon rules will apply instead. Perhaps what the 
judges meant was that given the ambiguity of the clause, it was left to be determined by the usual principles 
which statutory “track” the dispute fell under. Since the parties chose to leave the applicable rules provision 
open-ended, that also evidenced an intention to leave the applicable law to be similarly determined by law, that 
is, if it does not fall under the definition of an “international arbitration” under section 5 of the IAA, then the 
domestic AA applies by default. 
26 As noted, the regime adopted by the IAA is the UNCITRAL Model Law, while the AA was modeled after the 
English Arbitration Act of 1996 (which regime is generally not as extensive or comprehensive as the former). 
The main differences between the Acts relates to the extent of court intervention, which is more restrictive 
under the IAA than under the AA. For example, the court’s power to hear appeals on questions of law that 
appears under the AA, is not an option under the IAA (although such an award may still be set aside on grounds 
common to both Acts). Differences like these are significant and, depending on the issues that arise during 
arbitration, may determine its conduct and result in a different outcome. 
27 Ibid.  at paras. 17 and 19. 
28 See Bunge S.A. v Kruse  [1979] Lloyd’s Rep. 279, Cremer v Granaria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 583 and China 
Agribusiness Development Corporation v. Balli Trading [1998] 2 Lloyd’s L.R. 76. 
 
In the High Court decision of Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan,29 which came out on 28 May 2004, Judith Prakash J. affirmed what has largely been 
espoused by arbitration treatises on the drafting and construction of arbitration clauses. That is, 
the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase “arising out of” is narrower than that of the 
phrase “in connection with”, requiring a “more direct connection” between the dispute and the 
contract.30 Presumably, although it was not addressed in the judgment, “in connection with” is in 
pari materia with “in relation to” or “relating to” in terms of its ambit or extent of coverage. 
However, it is to be noted that the context of the arbitration clause and the circumstances of the 
case may also shed light on the intention of the parties when they included those words of 
qualification. Perhaps when drafting a clause, if there is an inclusive intent, using such 
connectors as “arising out of or in connection with” may be the safest thing to do to avoid such 
disputes over the scope of the clause.  
 
This problem with the scope or coverage of an arbitration clause or agreement also often 
surfaces in the context of the word “disputes” and its meaning. It was certainly the point of 
contention in the earlier case of Mark Grow Engineering Pte. Ltd. v. Goodland Development Pte. Ltd.,31 
wherein the District Court judge had to decide whether a stay should be allowed. Having 
decided that the arbitration clause was in a separate document incorporated by reference in the 
parties’ contract, the crux of the issue then turned on whether there was a “dispute”, and the 
onus was on the party resisting the application for a stay to show that the other party had no 
defence to the claim; hence an “undisputed or indisputable claim”. The judge endorsed and 
followed the Kwan Im Tong Chinese Temple case,32 which took a “holistic and commonsense 
approach” to identifying the existence of a dispute. He determined that there was a dispute 
justifying a stay and one which was fit to be referred to arbitration in this case. Again, for a wide-
encompassing phrase, perhaps something along the line of “any questions, disputes, 
disagreements or differences” will be useful, albeit potentially wordy.33 
 
The courts cannot restrain an arbitrator from continuing an arbitration hearing even while his 
appointment, or jurisdiction under the arbitration agreement, is in issue.34 However, in PT Tugu 
                                                  
29 [2004] 3 Sing.L.R. 184. 
30 Ibid. at para. 18. 
31 [2003] SGDC 230. 
32 Kwan Im Tong Chinese Temple & Anor v. Fong Choon Hung Construction Pte. Ltd. [1998] 2 Sing.L.R. 137. 
33 I.e., the tribunal is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction, either as a preliminary issue or in the award on 
its merits. The equivalent provision under the AA is section 21. If it rules that it has jurisdiction as a preliminary 
issue, the dissatisfied party can apply to the High Court for a decision. The court will decide the matter 
independently of the tribunal’s ruling and is not limited to the grounds raised before it. See supra Note 21 for 
other recent similar cases. 
34 For an example of the former, see Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Easton Graham Rush and 
Another [2004] 2 Sing.L.R. 14. The plaintiff in this case was challenging the appointment of the arbitrator who 
decided to continue with further hearings pending the challenge. The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction 
from the court to restrain him from continuing with the arbitration until the challenge to his appointment was 
resolved. The court held that it was for the arbitrator and not the courts to decide whether to stay arbitral 
proceedings under the Model Law. For the courts to grant such an injunction would be to go against the spirit 
and substance of Article 5 of the Model Law, which provided that “no court shall intervene except where so 
provided in this Law”. On the contrary, Article 13(3) indicated that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether 
arbitral proceedings shoul d be stayed pending the court’s ruling on the challenge, and the Commission’s report 
also demonstrated that the court was barred from granting interlocutory injunctions to stop him from doing so 
Pratama Indonesia v. Magma Nusantara Ltd.,35 it was held that the court’s power under Article 16(3) 
of the Model Law (applicable through the International Arbitration Act) to determine the issue of 
jurisdiction, after a tribunal has made a preliminary ruling, included ancillary orders (such as 
orders of costs made by the tribunal in relation to that ruling). That power involved an 
independent determination from the tribunal’s own finding or reasoning based on the kompetenz-
kompetenz principle.36  
 
C. Standard Required for Appeals on Questions of Law 
 
One of the last remaining bastions of court “supremacy” over private arbitration is the 
statutorily preserved judicial control over or intervention in arbitral awards. The extent of 
judicial intervention varies throughout the world with some countries, particularly the Western 
European ones, opting for minimum control whilst others retain some measure of review, albeit 
usually with a high threshold requirement, for example, the comprehensive English Arbitration 
Act of 1996. As already noted, since 2002, Singapore distinguishes between domestic and 
international arbitrations. Unlike the domestic AA and the old AA, there is no appeal on 
questions of law arising out of an award made by the arbitral tribunal in an international 
arbitration (under the IAA). However, there have been some interesting distinctions made in 
relation to the standard for the grant of leave to appeal on the basis of questions of law in recent 
Singapore cases which are worth looking at.  
  
In the case of Liew Ter Kwang v. Hurry General Contractor Pte. Ltd. ,37 which came out on 11 May 
2004, the issue was whether there should be a lower threshold applied to an application for leave 
of court to appeal on questions of law arising from standard-form building contracts. The 
applicable provisions here were subsections 28(2) and (4) of the old Arbitration Act. The contract 
between the applicant and the respondent incorporated the Singapore Institute of Architects’ 
Articles and Conditions of Building Contract (Lump Sum Contract)38, which contained standard 
contractual clauses used in building contracts in Singapore.  
 
The questions dealt with the interpretation of clauses in the Conditions relating to the grant of 
extensions of time by the architect. Judith Prakash J. held that, in deciding whether to grant leave 
to appeal, the appropriate approach in this case was a less restrictive one. The reasoning was 
premised on the fact that this case did not involve a one-off contract, but rather a form of 
contract that was frequently used. Hence, a resolution of the questions of law would “add to the 
certainty and comprehensiveness of the law”. Her approach followed a series of English and 
Singapore cases, which established that the discretion to grant leave for a one-off contract or clause 
will be more strictly exercised (by the application of an “obviously wrong” test) than for standard 
                                                                                                                                                        
[ibid. at paras. 24 to 29]. Moreover, there was clearly no such power for the court to so act under the relevant 
provisions (Articles 13 and 34 on the challenge procedure and on the setting aside of an award respectively). 
35 [2003] 4 Sing.L.R. 257. 
36 The case was also important in determining that an agreement to refer disputes to an “appraiser” can be an 
arbitration agreement and that the functions of an appraiser need not be confined to that of apportioning 
monetary value of loss or damage. The judge referred to a statement in the Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th 
ed., Vol. 49(1), 1996) which stated that the terms “valuer” and “appraiser” have similar meanings and that a 
valuer appointed to resolve disputes may concomitantly act as an arbitrator. Finally, the case also reiterated the 
now well-accepted principle that an arbitration clause trumps an arbitral rule in the event of a conflict.  
37 [2004] 3 Sing.L.R. 59. 
38 1997, 5th ed. 
form contracts or boilerplate clauses ,39 owing to the fact that the resolution of questions of law in the 
latter respect will clarify the law for subsequent contracts. Once a “strong prima facie case” has 
been made out that the arbitrator was wrong in his construction of the terms of the contract, 
leave will be granted.40 
 
The treatment of the facts in this case can be contrasted to that in the more recent Singapore 
Court of Appeal case of Northern Elevator Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v. United Engineers (Singapore) Pte. 
Ltd. (No 2) ,41 which the judges held to be a one-off case where the dispute raised an issue of 
concern that was “of a singular character unlikely to recur”, and any findings on the dispute 
would have little application beyond the parties and the matter.42 The court found that there was 
no “question of law” arising from the award as the arbitrator incorrectly applied an established 
principle of law, which only constituted a mere “error of law”. A question of law involves a 
finding of law which the parties dispute and thus requires the guidance of the court to resolve. 
In this case, neither party disputed the applicability of the principle in question (i.e., the 
compensatory principle).43 As such, no question of law arose from the award in this case and 
leave was not granted. 
 
D. Stay of Court Proceedings 
 
1. The Relationship between Summary Judgments and Stay Applications 
 
It is established that the courts can and will grant an Order 14 summary judgment even in cases 
where parties had contractually agreed to refer disputes to arbitration.44 Prior to 1 December 
2002, when the Rules of Court, including Order 14 Rule 1, was amended, the practice was for 
the courts to hear both Order 14 and stay applications concurrently. This made sense as it was 
efficient and saves both time and money. However, since the amendment, some confusion has 
arisen regarding this order of procedure.  
 
                                                  
39 See in particular, Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. BTP Tioxide Ltd. (The Nema) [1982] App.Cas. 724, American 
Home Assurance Co v. Hong Lam Marine Pte. Ltd.  [1999] 3 Sing.L.R. 682, The Antaios: Antaios Compania 
Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB [1985] App.Cas. 191 and Hong Huat Development Co. (Pte.) Ltd. v Hiap 
Hong & Co. Pte. Ltd. [2000] 2 Sing.L.R. 609. Also, see United Engineers (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Northern 
Elevator Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd. [2003] SGHC 158, wherein the judge endorsed the Nema principles to the 
effect that the guidelines for granting leave under section 28 of the old AA were that “where the construction 
was of a “one-off” contract or clause, then discretion was to be strictly exercised and leave normally refused 
unless the arbitrator was obviously wrong”, but “if the construction was of a standard contract or clause, then a 
less guarded approach would be adopted and leave would be granted where the resolution of the question would 
add significantly to the clarity, certainty and comprehensiveness of the law and there was strong prima facie 
evidence that the arbitrator was wrong”. As this appeal involved the determination of the arbitrator's exercise 
and the application of general principles governing award of damages, it was determined not to be of a “one-
off” nature [ibid. at paras. 13 to 14]. 
40 Ibid. at paras. 5-6. An additional requirement for the grant of leave to appeal was that the determination of the 
questions of law would have a “substantial effect” on the rights of one or more parties to the arbitration. An 
extension of time satisfied the “substantial effect” test. It would appear that this additional requirement is even 
easier to satisfy than the first requirement. 
41 [2004] 2 Sing.L.R. 494. 
42 Ibid. at paras. 23 to 24. 
43 Ibid. at paras. 17 to 22. 
44 The High Court judge referred to Aoki Corp. v. Lippoland (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. [1992] 1 Sing.L.R. 609, as an 
authority for this rule [ibid. at para. 5]. 
In the High Court case of Chinese Chamber Realty Pte. Ltd. and Others v. Samsung Corp.45, the issue 
that arose for consideration by Rajendran J.  was whether the assistant registrar was right in 
granting the plaintiffs leave to file their Order 14 application without the defence having been 
served, in view of the fact that Order 14 Rule 1 provided that a plaintiff may only so apply after 
the statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has served a defence 
to the statement of claim. The judge held on 15 August 2003 that the assistant registrar had 
unjustifiably overridden the clear words of the order,46 and upheld the former position, which 
was for both the Order 14 and stay applications to be heard together (a “compromise order”). 
The defendant could file its defence at the hearing on the understanding that it would not be 
construed as a “step in the proceedings” so as to have submitted itself to the court’s jurisdiction. 
 
The defendant brought the matter to the Court of Appeal in Samsung Corp. v. Chinese Chamber 
Realty Pte. Ltd. and Others,47 which gave judgment on 29 December 2003 allowing the appeal. The 
judged felt that this was not a case where there was a need, an injustice, or an abuse compelling 
enough to justify the courts overriding the clear provisions of the amended Rules of Court, 
specifically Order 14 in this case.48 The effect of the new Order 14 Rule 1 was that no Order 14 
application should be entertained while a stay application was pending, and after that, only when 
a defence has been filed in accordance with the Rule.49  
 
This is more in keeping with the spirit of section 6(1) of the Arbitration Act and certainly pays 
some respect to the arbitral forum of determination. It also streamlines the procedure so that a 
defendant wanting to enforce an arbitration agreement need not have to perform “a “gymnastic” 
exercise in order to achieve a result” by having to “run two contradictory courses of action.”50 
Making the defendant file a defence, albeit without prejudice to his stay application, would 
clearly be inefficient and illogical, particularly if he is likely to be eventually granted a stay.  
 
2. “Steps in the Proceedings” as an Impediment to a Stay Application  
 
Almost a year later, on 29 October 2004, Belinda Ang J. revisited the issue in the case of 
Australian Timber Products Pte. Ltd. v. Koh Brothers Building and Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte.) Ltd.51 
The judge referred to the above Court of Appeal decision but distinguished the case on its 
facts.52 Although this case did involve the issue of stay of court proceedings under section 6(1) 
Arbitration Act, it dealt specifically with the question of whether an action brought in breach of 
an arbitration agreement resulting in a default judgment can be set aside if the defendant refused 
to file its defence pending a stay application, and whether doing so would have “constituted a 
step in the proceedings” sufficient to submit it to the court’s jurisdiction despite the agreement. 
 
The first thing to note about this decision is that the defendant prejudiced itself by not filing its 
defence, while actively pursuing a stay application, an act which would not have compromised its 
                                                  
45 [2003] 3 Sing.L.R. 656. 
46 Ibid. at para. 18. 
47 [2004] 1 Sing.L.R. 382. 
48 The high threshold was enunciated in the Court of Appeal case of Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. Law Society of 
Singapore [2001] 4 Sing.L.R. 25. 
49 Ibid. at paras. 22 to 23. 
50 Ibid.  at para. 24. 
51 [2004] SGHC 243. 
52 Ibid. at paras. 12 to 15. 
application. An act of defence need not constitute submission to court jurisdiction as long as it is 
made clear that that is the case. A pending stay application alone does not stop time running for 
the service of the defence.53 Because an Order 14 default judgement was made, the defendant 
had to live with the consequence of its failure to act. 
 
Hence, a defendant should be diligent in filing its defence even while pursuing a stay, and should 
not think that the arbitration agreement itself trumps the court process without active 
involvement in defending itself (while, of course, reserving its legal right to stay the court 
proceedings).54 In this case, the defendant bore the burden of either bringing forward the 
hearing date of the stay application for immediate hearing as a matter of urgency, or of applying 
for an extension of time to serve its defence under Order 3 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court while 
also seeking an urgent hearing of the matter. As the judge put it succinctly, “[a] proactive 
approach should be adopted”.55 
 
The second thing to note is that even though an act would otherwise be regarded as a step in the 
proceedings, it would not be treated as such if the applicant makes it crystal clear that he does 
not submit to the court’s jurisdiction and intended to seek a stay, or reserves his right to do so, 
such as seeking an extension of time to serve defence when proceedings have already begun 
against it in the courts. Even an application to set aside a default judgment need not constitute a 
step in the proceedings. However, because the defendant in this case was not careful, it lost its 
right to a stay of the proceedings and was faced with the Order 14 default judgment which it 
eventually failed to set aside, being unable to prove to the court’s satisfaction that it had a 
defence on the merits with “a real prospect of success and carries some degree of conviction”. 
The moral of the story is that a defendant should proceed to state a defence to protect its 
position, and that should not prejudice its intention to seek a stay of the proceedings provided 
that that is stated clearly and there was no submission to the court’s jurisdiction.56 
 
That was the mistake made by the defendant in the case of Chong Long Hak Kee Construction 
Trading Co. v. IEC Global Pte. Ltd. .57 Tay Yong Kwang J. held that the defendant had prejudiced 
itself by filing a counterclaim to the Plaintiff’s suit against it, and taking the step of serving a 48-
hour notice on the plaintiff for its counterclaim, an action which the assistant registrar correctly 
took to constitute a step in the proceedings. Hence, the defendant was no longer entitled to a 
stay under section 6(1) of the Arbitration Act, as the court no longer had the discretion to grant a 
stay. A counterclaim constituted a “step that affirmed the correctness of the proceedings or 
demonstrated a willingness or intention to defend the substance of the claim in court instead of 
at arbitration.”58 
                                                  
53 And unless unsuccessful, also does not provide the basis for a request for an extension of time to file a 
defence. 
54 The judge noted that a pending stay application in itself does not stop time running for the service of the 
defence. She further stated that “[t]he Rules of Court have their own self-contained provisions relating to the 
service of defence, time extension and default judgment. Unless and until there is a stay order to halt 
proceedings, the plaintiff is entitled to give notice to the defendant to serve its defence. It is for a defendant, 
faced with a 48-hour notice to serve its defence, to respond appropriately.” [ibid. at para. 16]. 
55 Ibid. at para. 16. 
56 A step taken in the proceedings will prevent a party’s right to seek a stay application and it is not in the 
court’s discretion whether or not to allow a stay despite such a step. 
57 [2003] 4 Sing.L.R. 499. 
58 Ibid. at para. 9. 
 
A defendant should normally file its stay application immediately and not along with its defence. 
In this case, as the defence and even the counterclaim did contain an express reservation of its 
right to stay the proceedings in favour of arbitration, it still preserved the defendant’s right. 
However, the mistake came when the defendant served the 48-hour notice on the plaintiff for its 
counterclaim, an act showing what the court took to be its serious intention to pursue the 
counterclaim in the courts rather than at arbitration. As the matters covered under both the 
defence and counterclaim were “intertwined”, that step was taken to have vitiated the 
defendant’s arguments that it had shown a clear and unequivocal intention to arbitrate the 
matter. Hence the stay application was dismissed by the High Court judge.59 
 
3. When an Action can be Stayed and the Scope of Judicial Discretion and Scrutiny under Section 6(2) of the 
AA and the IAA 
 
Often, the ‘trigger’ for a proper commencement of arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement or clause is a “dispute” and/or a “differences” between the parties to the underlying 
contract or transaction.60 For example, under section 6(1) of the IAA, court proceedings initiated 
“in respect of any matter which is the subject of the [arbitration] agreement” are to be stayed “so 
far as the proceedings relate to that matter”.61 The “matter” refers to the triggering incident, 
which directly relates to the contract in question (the “subject”). Hence, it would seem to suggest 
that in the case of an arbitration agreement or clause that refers a dispute and/or differences 
between the parties to arbitration, it is the “realness” or “genuineness” of that very dispute 
and/or differences that the court before which the action is brought must determine before it 
can stay the action for arbitration. Otherwise it may very well happen that an action is stayed in a 
matter that is, at the same time, not ripe for arbitration (falling outside the scope of the 
jurisdictional limits of the arbitration mandate). That was determined to be the case in relation to 
section 6(2) of the AA. However, it has been held that section 6(2) of the IAA requires an 
almost automatic staying order.62 The argument in support for this is that the arbitration tribunal 
can determine whether it has jurisdiction under the competenz-competenz principle, and that a 
matter that is not susceptible to arbitration or outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, 
can still be returned to the courts for resolution (and hence not deprived of its day in court). 
 
In Dalian Hualiang Enterprise Group Co Ltd and Another v Louis Dreyfus Asia Pte Ltd,63 the first 
plaintiff, Dalian Hualiang Enterprise (DHE) entered into a contract with the defendant, Louis 
                                                  
59 Ibid. at paras. 11 and 13. 
60 It is a well-established principle that if the court finds that there is no dispute between the parties where a 
dispute is a condition precedent for an arbitration to be initiated, then there are no sufficient grounds to stay 
court proceedings under section 6 of the AA. Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Sintal Enterprise Pte Ltd, 
[2005] 2 Sing.L.R. 530; [2005] SGCA 10. The burden of proof is on the party resisting the stay of proceedings 
to show that the other party had no defence to the claim [ibid.  at paras. 5 to 6]. 
61 Section 6(1) of the IAA is a modified version of Article 8(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial 
Arbitration (adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985 as United 
Nations document A/40/17, Annex I), which states the stage when an application for a stay can be made to be 
“[when] a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute”. 
Section 6(1) and Article 8(1) lays out the procedural requirements for a stay application, which is a condition 
precedent for the court before which proceedings are brought to render a stay. 
62 “[U]nless it is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.” (last para. to section 6(2) of the IAA). 
63 [2005] 4 Sing.L.R. 646; [2005] SGHC 161. 
Dreyfus Asia (LD). The former later assigned its rights and obligations under the contract to the 
second plaintiff, Dalian Jinshi Oil-Making Co Ltd (DJOM). Subsequently, DJOM made two 
claims under the contract against LD. Sally Yang of LD’s China offices admitted certain sums to 
be payable on DJOM’s claims and the plaintiffs filed an action against LD for those sums. LD 
applied for a stay of the action pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the contract. A central 
issue to the case was whether Sally Yang had the authority to bind LD, and hence, whether she 
was an employee of LD (the authority issue). There was also the issue of whether LD could set-
off the plaintiffs’ claim (if successful) from its claim based upon another contract with a 
company that LD alleged was part of the group of companies that included both plaintiffs 
insofar as the running account was concerned (the set-off issue). On the basis that there was a 
dispute between the parties over the above issues, the assistant registrar decided to stay the 
action on the basis of section 6(1) of the IAA since the matter was not capable of court 
resolution. 
 
The plaintiffs, however, appealed against that decision. The parties’ contentions necessarily 
involved a consideration of the court’s role under section 6(2) of the IAA, which states that the 
court to which an application for a stay is sought under subsection (1) “shall make an order” 
staying the proceedings “so far as the proceedings relate to the matter”.64 According to the 
plaintiffs, the court had the jurisdiction and obligation to determine if the case brought before it 
related to the subject of the arbitration agreement between the parties. On the contrary, the 
defendant argued that the court was obliged to refer any dispute to arbitration so long as there 
was a dispute. Whether there was a dispute and the court’s role in determining its existence and 
genuineness (as a fact) was potentially relevant to both of the issues in question.65 
 
The High Court judge held that the court had no jurisdiction to order a stay under section 6(2) 
of the IAA if the court proceedings were not in respect of a matter which was the subject of the 
arbitration agreement. As such, it is necessary for the court to determine if the matter before the 
court was the subject of the arbitration agreement between the parties. However, to restrain 
residual judicial discretion and avoid undue interference with the arbitral regime, the judge 
qualified that if the issues were arguable in that the outcome was not clear, then the court should 
stay the proceedings anyway.66 
 
The judge proceeded to determine that on the facts, the merits of the authority issue were clearly 
in favour of the plaintiffs as there were independent admissions from LD besides the one 
coming from Sally Yang.67 The judge also determined that the set-off issue was not the subject 
of the arbitration agreement at all as the parties and contracts were distinct.68 
 
                                                  
64 “[U]nless it is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.” (last para. to section 6(2) of the IAA). 
65 To put it in another way, the question was whether the court or the arbitral tribunal should be the appropriate 
authority to determine whether the court proceedings were in respect of a matter which was the subject of an 
arbitration agreement. 
66 Ibid. at para. 25. 
67 Ibid. at para. 14. 
68 Even giving the phrase “any dispute” under the arbitration agreement “a wide interpretation” does not extend 
it to cover a dispute unrelated to the subject of the agreement, which in this case was the contract. Ibid. at paras. 
29 to 30. 
On the matter relating to the “dispute” as the triggering incident, as was the case here, the court 
had to consider if it had any discretion to determine the genuineness of a dispute before 
deciding to order a stay.69 On this question, the court’s approach to the domestic and 
international regimes diverged at a divider on the dual carriage arbitral highway. Under section 
6(2) of the IAA, the court was not to consider if there was in fact a dispute or whether there was 
a “genuine dispute”.70 On the other hand, under section 6(2) of the AA, the court might 
determine if there was in fact a dispute before deciding to order a stay,71 although “the court 
should not examine the validity of the dispute as though the stay application was an application 
for summary judgment.”72  
 
This case once again highlights subtle differences between the domestic and international 
arbitration regimes. The latter enjoys more independence and a hand-off approach from the 
courts than the former, even at the point of initiation. There is a greater willingness on the part 
of the courts to consider merits in cases meant for domestic arbitration rather than those that 
are slated for international arbitration for which the concept of “minimal court involvement” 
reaches its lowest limits. 
 
Another lesson is that if the parties indeed require a “real” or “genuine” dispute as a valid 
incident to trigger arbitration (and hence provide the basis for a stay), then they should clearly 
state it as a requirement under the arbitration agreement rather than use “all dispute” or “any 
dispute”.73 
 
Even if there is no need to examine the genuineness of a “dispute” under section 6(2) of the 
IAA, the party seeking arbitration should ensure that there is some evidence of a dispute (such 
as making a “positive assertion”) because the existence of one may be in issue. As the judge 
noted in this case, a simple refusal to pay or silence may not even amount to a dispute.74  
 
4. Stay in the Absence of an Arbitration Agreement 
 
Still on the matter of stay proceedings, in another case, Yee Hong Pte Ltd v Tan Chye Hee Andrew 
(Ho Bee Development Pte Ltd, Third Party),75 another High Court judge considered the issue of 
whether the court had a discretion under section 6(5) of the AA to order an arbitration in the 
absence of an arbitration agreement, and if so, the circumstances in which that was appropriate.  
 
                                                  
69 This portion of the judge’s decision appears to be obiter dicta given the prior determination in relation to the 
subject. Ibid. at para. 31. 
70 The plaintiffs argued that in order for a dispute to be capable of being referred to arbitration there must be an 
arguable case for disputing the claim, and if the defence was bad then there was no real or genuine and hence no 
triggering incident for arbitration. The defendants on the other hand argued that even a simple refusal to pay on 
a contract upon demand could constitute a dispute for the purposes of the agreement giving rise to a valid basis 
for arbitration proceedings to be commenced (and consequently, there was no basis for the court not to grant a 
stay). The judge preferred the latter argument based on the literal interpretation of the terms of the agreement 
and the ordinary meaning of words used. 
71 On the basis of “no sufficient reason” under section 6(2) of the AA. 
72 Ibid. at para. 74. 
73 Ibid. at para. 39. 
74 The judge went further to opine that an admission by a defendant would, generally speaking, be contrary to a 
dispute, but qualified that not every admission would necessarily avoid a stay order [ibid. at para. 75]. 
75 [2005] 4 Sing.L.R. 398; [2005] SGHC 163. 
The case involved a dispute between the plaintiff, which was the main contractor of a 
condominium project, and the defendant, which was its architect. A third party, the developer, 
was joined to the action by the defendant. As was customary in construction contracts, there 
were arbitration clauses in the various contracts relating to the same project. Both the main 
contract entered into between the plaintiff and the third party and the contract between the 
defendant and the third party contained arbitration clauses. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
breached of contract (i.e. his duties as the architect). The third party sought a stay so that the 
matter may be referred to arbitration as the matter was related to an earlier dispute between the 
plaintiff and the third party, but the application was refused by the Assistant Registrar. The third 
party appealed that decision to the High Court 
 
The judge held that section 6(5) of the AA empowered the court to stay an action and order the 
parties to arbitrate their dispute despite the absence of an arbitration agreement where the 
dispute arose out of the same subject, which was previously arbitrated upon and involved the 
same parties.76 In this case, the judge found that the as the defendant was making a claim for an 
indemnity or contribution through or under the third party (by third party proceedings), the 
defendant was a party to the arbitration agreement between the main contract plaintiff and the 
third party that contained an arbitration agreement. Moreover, it would be consistent and highly 
unsatisfactory otherwise, for two disputes that arose out of the same subject, in this case the 
project, to be resolved in the same forum.77 Not only would it determine the whole dispute 
among all the parties involved, it would also save time and costs.78 
 
E. Singapore’s Stance on Confidentiality amongst Parties and Arbitrators 
 
For the first time, on 6 June 2003, our courts had the opportunity to take its stance on the issue 
of confidentiality amongst the parties to an arbitration and the panel of arbitrators. Particularly 
important was the question of whether, and if so to what extent, documents and information 
used in arbitration are confidential and should not be divulged in subsequent proceedings or to 
the public. Kan Ting Chiu J. sitting as the judge on the High Court case of Myanma Yaung Chi Oo 
Co. Ltd. v. Win Win Nu and Another,79 took the opportunity to address these questions. 
 
It is in the nature of arbitral proceedings that it is held in private (i.e. , not open to the public). In 
fact, that was one of the original features of the arbitral process which was considered attractive 
to its users. Privacy and confidentiality are, however, two different concepts which should not be 
confused. The right to privacy in the conduct of arbitral proceedings is commonly provided for 
in institutional arbitration rules. Unlike most court litigation, the rule is that the general public is 
usually not allowed to attend arbitral hearings and have no right of access to the written records 
of the proceedings. Common law jurisdictions have also upheld this rule as an implicit 
understanding in an agreement to arbitrate.80 
 
                                                  
76 Section 6(5) of the AA states that for the purposes of that section, “a reference to a party includes a reference 
to any person claiming through or under such party.” Ibid. at paras. 25 to 27. Section 6(5) of the IAA contains 
an equivalent provision. 
77 Ibid. at para. 30. A “more suitable” forum. 
78 Ibid. at para. 27. 
79 [2003] 2 Sing.L.R. 547. 
80 See Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The Eastern Saga) [1984] 3 All E.R. 835. 
On the other hand, confidentiality in arbitration has given rise to inconsistent and disparate 
treatment between jurisdictions. For example, under English law, there is a general rule of 
confidentiality in relation to documents and information generated or produced in the course of 
arbitral proceedings.81 The cases have upheld a good measure of protection against disclosure 
subject to the exceptions that have slowly been carved out by subsequent case law.82 On the 
other hand, in Australia and the United States, there is no general duty of confidentiality at all.83 
 
In the Win Win Nu case, the defendants wanted to produce affidavits referring to documents 
and information elicited during an arbitration proceeding with the plaintiffs to support their 
application to strike out or stay the plaintiff’s action commenced in the courts on the basis that 
the plaintiffs abused the court process as they had launched similar actions in different fora 
(instituting arbitration proceedings and bringing actions before the Myanmar courts). By doing 
so, the plaintiffs were acting vexatiously and oppressively against the defendants. The plaintiffs 
objected to the disclosure and the assistant registrar agreed by refusing to admit the affidavits. 
On the appeal before Kan Ting Chui J., the issue was, inter alia, whether parties to an arbitration 
proceeding owed any duty of confidence to each other, and if so, whether leave of the court was 
required for disclosure.  
 
The judge held that there was a general duty of confidence of arbitral documents and 
information, thus expressly endorsing the English position in this regard.84 Similarly, the court 
held that a party can be relieved of that duty if the “reasonable necessity” exception is applicable. 
Notably, leave of court is not necessary in such a case (unlike in the English courts).85 However, 
                                                  
81 Dolling-Baker v. Merrett & Another [1991] 2 All E.R. 890. It was a contractual term implied by “custom and 
business efficacy” that documents generated for, and disclosed during, the discovery process should be kept in 
confidence. In such a case, only by leave of court by a showing of relevance and necessity can such materials be 
ordered to be produced during the discovery process. 
82 For example, an award and its reasons may be used for the purpose of establishing a cause of action against or 
defending a claim brought by a third party without the leave of court. Where the interests of the arbitrating party 
require disclosure, for example to enforce an arbitral award, the general rule will also not apply. See Hassneh 
Insurance Company of Israel & Others v. Steuart J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243. Another exception to the 
rule of confidentiality is where the “public interest” and the “interest of justice” require disclosure. See London 
& Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd. (No. 2) [1995] Estates Gazette 134; and Ali Shipping Corporation v. 
Shipyard “Trogir” [1998] 2 All E.R. 136. Disclosure for the purpose of establishing an issue estoppel and the 
enforcement of rights accorded by an arbitral award is another exception. See Associated Electric and Gas 
Insurance Services Ltd. v. European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] UKPC 11. This is so even if there 
was a confidentiality clause. 
83 See Alliance v. Australian Gas Light Co. [1983] 34 S.A.S.R. 215 at 229-232; and ESSO Australia Resources 
Limited & Others v. The Honourable Sidney James Plowman (The Minister for Energy and Minerals) & Others 
[1995] 128 A.L.R. 391. Even if there was an express confidentiality clause in the arbitration agreement, the 
courts may allow disclosure in the “public interest”. See Commonwealth of Australia v. Cockatoo Dockyard 
Pty. Ltd. [1995] 36 N.S.W.L.R. 662. Unless otherwise expressly agreed between, or provided for by, the parties, 
they are not required to treat arbitration proceedings and what transpired in confidence. See Industrotech 
Constructors Inc. v. Duke University [1984] 314 S.E.2d 272; Giacobazzi Grandi Vini S.p.A. v. Renfield Corp. 
[1987] US Dist. LEXIS 1783; and United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp. et al (1988, Del) 118 F.R.D. 346. 
84 Ibid. at paras. 9 and 17. 
85 Ibid. at para. 19. But he went on to state that it is not for one party alone to decide whether the disclosure is 
reasonably necessary, and if the other party disputes the necessity, it can apply to expunge the disclosure. Then 
the court will determine if it is reasonably necessary, and make an order to expunge it if it is not [ibid. at para. 
20]. 
on the facts, as the arbitration proceedings had been terminated by the time of the appeal, it was 
held that the previously existing basis ceased to exist; hence there would be no disclosure. 
 
It is to be noted then that Singapore’s position on confidentiality can be extrapolated as follows: 
there is a general duty of confidence of documents and information generated or produced 
during the arbitration proceeding. This duty is an implied term of the parties’ contract which 
arises from their expectations of the arbitration agreement and process.86 The exception to this is 
where it is “reasonably necessary” to do so. This will depend on the facts of each case and the 
reasons for the disclosure.87 Other exceptions which the court did not explicitly endorse (but 
which it is likely to embrace) include, if the parties consent (and there is no issue of confidence 
to third parties, such as witnesses); if there is leave of the court or an order of the court to 
produce, and if it is in the “public interest” or it is in the “interest of justice” to do so.88 
 
F. An Examination of the Grounds for Setting Aside, Natural Justice and the “Final and Binding” Principle 
 
A recent case examined the grounds for setting aside under Article 34(2)(a)(ii)(iii) and (b)(ii) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law (i.e. public policy, jurisdiction and the right to present a case), 
section 24(b) of the IAA (i.e. natural justice) and the meaning and effect of the “final and 
binding” principle under section 19B(1) of the IAA. 
 
PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA,89 was a case where the applicant sought the 
setting aside of an arbitral award on several bases, namely that: (a) the award was in conflict with 
the public policy of Singapore; (b) the award dealt with disputes or issues not contemplated by, 
or not falling within, the terms of the submission to arbitration; (c) a breach of natural justice 
had occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of the applicant 
had been prejudiced; and (d) the applicant was not given a full opportunity to present its case or 
was otherwise unable to present its case.  
 
There are several points to note in relation to this case. First, the court’s decision continues to 
reflect the attitude that a setting aside requires strong reasons and that the usual attempts to set 
aside based on a multitude of grounds do not necessarily increase its chances of success. Second, 
the judge took the opportunity to clarify the meaning and effect of the grounds for setting aside 
as contained in Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (which is given force of law in 
Singapore via the IAA), which will provide further guidance to the appropriateness of bringing 
an action for setting aside on those grounds based on the same or similar types of arguments in 
the future.  
 
                                                  
86 The case did not address whether the obligation extended to witnesses as such. However, it is interesting to 
note that in England, an expert witness appointed by one party has been held to owe an obligation of 
confidentiality to both parties. Similarly, parties owe an obligation of confidence to their witnesses and the 
panel of arbitrators and vice versa . See London & Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd. (No. 2) [1995] Estates 
Gazette 134. 
87 E.g., for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party’s legal rights vis-a-vis a third party in 
order to found a cause of action against that third party or to defend against a claim, or counterclaim, brought by 
the third party; and to enforce an award or the rights and obligations arising out of an award. 
88 Ibid. at para. 9. 
89 [2006] 1 Sing.L.R. 197; [2005] SGHC 197. 
The applicant, a state-owned entity of the Republic of Indonesia, guaranteed notes issued by 
Rekasaran BI Ltd and others (the issuer). The respondent was a bank that held one of the notes 
issued by the issuer. The applicant took steps to restructure its obligations to all holders of the 
issuer’s notes after obtaining the approval of a majority of the holders of notes at a February 
2000 meeting. The respondent and other minority holders of the issuer’s notes opposed the 
move and commenced arbitration proceedings against the issuer and the applicant in the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) (first arbitration). The arbitral tribunal (first 
tribunal) of the first arbitration issued an award in favour of the respondent (first award). 
Meanwhile, another meeting was held in June 2001 to ratify the resolutions passed at the 
February 2000 meeting. In August 2001, the first tribunal was sent a note of the June 2001 
meeting.  
 
On 10 January 2002, the applicant commenced arbitration proceedings against the respondent 
and the other minority holders (second arbitration). The respondent applied to the second 
tribunal to try certain preliminary issues concerning its jurisdiction. The second tribunal issued 
an award (second award) determining the preliminary issues, after considering the written 
submissions of the parties but without calling for an oral hearing. The applicant then brought 
the case before the courts, seeking to set it aside under Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on the abovementioned grounds. However, the court dismissed its motion on all grounds 
on the following bases. 
 
On the public policy issue, the applicant’s only grouse was that parts of the second award 
contradicted the first award thereby ignoring the principle that an arbitral award is “final and 
binding” under section 19B(1) of the IAA. Therefore, on this ground alone, the applicant sought 
to evoke the public policy ground for a setting aside of the second award. The judge held that 
although a matter of public policy may be expressed by law (e.g. through legislative enactment), 
they are not the same thing although there is the possibility of overlap. There may be laws that 
do not give force to public policy and vice versa there may be public policy that may not be given 
the force of law. An example the judge gave for this was the generally accepted position in the 
law on arbitration that awards cannot be set aside on the basis of a mistake of law.90 In the 
context of a string of private arbitration proceedings dealing with the same parties and dispute, a 
conflict in awards on the facts and circumstances of this case did not amount to something that 
was in conflict with the public policy of the State so as to be susceptible to setting aside under 
Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.91 Nevertheless, if there was such a state of 
contradictory decisions breaching section 19B(1), the proper procedure was to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the second tribunal before the tribunal,92 and then before the court under Article 
16(3) and Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
 
                                                  
90 Ibid. at para. 29. 
91 The judge spoke about the reasons for, and effects of, section 19B(1) at para. 30.  
92 Or in the event that subsequent proceeding has not yet begun or has yet to be concluded, to seek an injunction 
for discontinuance. Ibid. at para. 30. The judge stated that “[t]he purpose of s[ection] 19B(1) of the Act was to 
make it clear and beyond dispute that each party to an international arbitration was bound by the award made by 
the tribunal and could not challenge it except on the limited grounds set out in the Act and the Model Law. If 
the same issue was dealt with for a second time in further arbitration proceedings, the second set of proceedings 
might be considered to be in breach of s[ection] 19B(1), and the remedy for the aggrieved party was either to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the second tribunal or to obtain an injunction against the continuation of the second 
set of proceedings.” 
On the basis that the second tribunal did not have the power to decide certain issues that had 
already been decided by the first tribunal,93 the judge decided that the second tribunal had come 
to a conclusion that was contrary to the opinion of the first tribunal, which it was not entitled to 
do.94 However, as only that part of the award which contained decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration might be set aside according to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the judge severed the contradictory finding after deciding that it did 
not affect the final decision of the second tribunal.95 The finding of estoppel could not be 
challenged on this ground.96 
 
On the accusations relating to the conduct of the arbitration, the applicant argued that there was 
a breach of natural justice,97 and that the applicant lacked the opportunity to present its case.98 
However, the judge found there to be no substance to the applicant’s complaints on the 
evidence before it. The judge held that the applicant had been given a full opportunity to present 
its case on the jurisdictional issue and that there was no evidence that the second tribunal had 
any ground for wondering whether the applicant fully appreciated what was being put against it. 
Moreover, even though the tribunal made an issue of a point that was never raised by either 
party, which related to the contradictory findings between the tribunals; because that finding was 
not determinative of its final conclusion, breach of natural justice had not occurred such as to 
prejudice the applicant.99 On the ground that there was no due process, the judge found that the 
parties’ conduct had rendered earlier directions contemplating an oral hearing of submissions to 
be ineffective. Moreover, when further directions were given for the filing of submissions by 
both parties, there was no direction that there would be a hearing thereafter at which oral 
submissions would be made. Also, neither party asked for an oral hearing. Hence, the applicant 
was not entitled to complain that it was not given the chance to orally address any concerns that 
the second tribunal might have had after reading both parties’ submissions.100 
 
G. The Relationship between Arbitration Institutions, Appointing Authorities and Arbitral Rules 
 
In the case of Bovis Lend Lease Pte Ltd v Jay-Tech Marine & Projects Pte Ltd and Another Application,101 
a dispute over a claim for the payment of a sum was brought to arbitration. At issue was whether 
the SIAC was the administrator and appointer of the arbitrator. The relevant arbitration clauses 
stated that unless agreed otherwise, the arbitrator was to be “appointed by the President of the 
Institute of Architects in Singapore (or such other body as carries on the functions of the 
Institute) or his nominee”, and that the arbitrator must conduct the proceedings in accordance 
                                                  
93 The issue related to the view of the second tribunal that the applicant had participated to a limited extent on 
the first arbitration, which was in contradiction to the opinion of the first tribunal. In contrast, the second 
tribunal’s finding that the June 2001 meeting would have been relevant for the first tribunal’s consideration had 
it been raised by the applicant as an issue was held not to contradict the latter’s findings as it stated that the note 
of the June 2001 meeting was irrelevant to the issues requiring determination in the first arbitration. Ibid. at 
paras 40 to 41. 
94 Ibid. at paras. 35 to 38. 
95 To the effect that the applicant was estopped from raising the issue of the June 2001 meeting in the 
arbitration. 
96 Ibid. at para. 42. 
97 See section 24(b) of the IAA. 
98 See Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
99 Ibid. at paras. 43 to 50. 
100 Ibid. at paras. 51 to 52. 
101 [2005] SGHC 91. 
with the SIAC Rules.102 The issue turned on contractual interpretation and the apparent conflict 
between the above two provisions based on their provisions.  
 
The defendant had submitted a notice of arbitration to the SIAC pursuant to the Domestic 
Rules and sought to have the arbitrator appointed by the SIAC pursuant to its institutional rules 
as the parties could not agree on an arbitrator.103 The plaintiff disputed that a domestic dispute 
necessarily meant that the reference to SIAC Rules was to its Domestic Rules or even that the 
dispute had to be administered by SIAC and appointment made by the chairman of SIAC.  
 
The judge held that “[i]t is in accordance with the principle of party autonomy that the parties 
were free to choose one body as their appointing authority and another body as their rules 
provider”,104 or “how their arbitral tribunal is to be constituted and how the arbitration proper is 
to be conducted.”105 Hence, she determined that even though the arbitration clause stated that 
the arbitrator must apply the SIAC Rules,106 the non-reference to which set of rules was 
applicable made it such that it was a matter for the arbitrator to decide which rules he would like 
to use once he had been appointed by the proper appointing authority.107 The arbitrator must be 
appointed according to the parties’ agreement, which was joint appointment, the failure of which 
will lead to an appointment by the Singapore Institute of Architects. Also, the failure to mention 
the appointment of SIAC as the institution of choice meant that the parties did not agree to its 
selection at the point of drafting and hence an ad hoc arbitration must have been intended.108 
 
Once again, careful drafting is essential to avoid conflict of arbitration provisions and the 
necessity to reconcile them.109 Also, specific provisions appear to take precedence over general 
terms. Moreover, it would be easier to appoint the institutional authority that produced the set 
of rules adopted, and in particular to specify which set of rules if there are several; although it 
does not mean that selecting a set of rules implied the choice of institution or even institutional 
                                                  
102 Ibid. at paras. 13.3.2 to 13.3.3. 
103 The judge determined that this was a domestic dispute based on the fact the parties were incorporated and 
had their places of business in Singapore at the conclusion of the arbitration agreement, and that the substantial 
part of the obligations of the commercial relationship was to be performed in Singapore (involving a 
construction project in Singapore). This was the test for determining whether a dispute was domestic under the 
Domestic Rules. The fact that it was a domestic dispute was not disputed.  
104 Ibid. at para. 19. The judge also noted at para. 20 that the provisions in the SIAC Domestic Rules may in 
some situations constitute “an unwarranted limitation on party autonomy” by stating that the parties’ agreement 
to submit or to refer their dispute to the SIAC for arbitration also means that they agree that the Domestic Rules 
will take precedence over any and all provisions in the underlying contract between them that related to dispute 
resolution by arbitration. For example, it prevents the parties from selecting anyone other than the chairman of 
the SIAC as the default appointer of arbitrator irrespective of any contrary indication in the underlying contract 
(which, in this case, was the Singapore Institute of Architects). There were also conflicts with the way arbitrator 
fees were to be determined under the Singapore Institute of Architects’ conditions of appointment on the one 
hand and under the SIAC Rules on the other. 
105 Ibid. at para. 18. 
106 Ibid. at para. 13. 
107 In such a case, the rules do not run the arbitration, but rather the arbitrator uses the rules as his instrument to 
facilitate the smooth conduct of the arbitration pursuant to section 23(1) and (2) of the AA. 
108 Ibid. at para. 21. 
109 The judge was critical of the bad drafting in this case at para. 17. She even made suggestions for proper 
drafting by referring to the recommended arbitration clause by SIAC (ibid. at para. 21). 
(as opposed to ad hoc) arbitration.110 Finally, the courts will attempt as much as possible to give 
effect to the parties’ real intentions, or if it could not be determined, at least what they would 
have intended if they had put their minds to the matter at the point in time when they were 
drafting the arbitration provisions. 
 
H. The Relationship between Arbitration Laws and other Legislation 
 
1. The Companies Act and the Standing to Arbitrate 
 
In Kiyue Company Limited v. Aquagen International Pte. Ltd.,111 the issue the court faced was whether 
the word “action” in section 216A(2) of the Companies Act112 included an “arbitration 
proceeding” so as to permit a minority shareholder complainant to bring an action in the name 
and on behalf of a company that is involved in arbitration proceedings. The court held that the 
Companies Act has clearly shown a discrimination between “action” and an “arbitration 
proceeding” under section 366(2)(a), and since words must be given a consistent meaning within 
the same statute, the word “action” is ordinarily a reference to proceedings commenced in court 
and not to arbitration (unless specifically legislated otherwise).113 Although who exactly is a 
“party” to an arbitration agreement, and thus eligible to participate in it, is not always clear,114 
this case has clarified to some extent the matter in the context of the Companies Act. Legislative 
amendments will have to be made in order to permit a minority shareholder to intervene and 
participate in an arbitration to protect its interests, if Parliament decides that that should be the 
case. 
 
2. The Rules of Court and the Issue of Time Limits 
 
In a 25 July 2003 judgment of the High Court issued by Lai Siu Chiu J., United Engineers 
(Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Northern Elevator Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd.,115 it was held that the time for an 
appeal to be filed against an arbitration award begins from the time that the arbitration award is 
ready for collection and not from the time that notice is given  of the time that the arbitration award 
would be ready for collection.116 This appears to be a fair and sound judgement for how can 
someone determine if he should file without looking at the judgment and how can he be diligent 
if the judgment is not even available? Moreover, if the reverse were true, one may technically be 
left with no time to consider at all, in the case where notice is given but collection may only be 
made very near the deadline. In this case, even though the applicants filed their appeal 28 days 
after notice that the arbitration award would be ready for collection, as they had done so within 
21 days of the time when the award was actually ready for collection, the appeal was held to have 
been filed on time. 
 
                                                  
110 This problem would not arise if rules of facilitative authorities were adopted. Moreover, institutional rules 
tend to contain provisions that relate to the institutional functions. 
111 [2003] 3 Sing.L.R. 130. 
112 Cap. 50, 1994 Rev. Ed. Sing. 
113 Ibid. at paras. 6, 7 and 10. 
114 Some examples of non-signatories who may have standing to commence, appear in and participate in an 
arbitration may arise in exceptions to the privity of contract doctrine, such as in situations involving assignment, 
novation, third-party beneficiaries, agency, and so on.  
115 [2003] SGHC 158. 
116 Ibid. at para. 18. 
Another case of interest here is ABC Co. v. XYZ Co. Ltd.117 This case involved an international 
arbitration. The arbitral tribunal had issued an interim award which the applicants sought to 
challenge by way of an originating motion in court for the award to be set aside. The motion 
originally stated two grounds as bases for setting aside the award, but the applicants later filed a 
summons-in-chambers seeking leave to amend the motion to add six new grounds as bases for 
setting aside the award. Judith Prakash J. refused the application in most part. She looked at 
Article 34(3) of the Model Law, and after examining its wording and their interpretation (with 
some help from the travaux preparatiores), she determined that the prescribed three-month period 
for filing an application to set aside was to be strictly enforced and allowed for no new grounds. 
Hence, the court does not have the power to extend time. However, there could still be an 
opportunity for the applicant to amend court proceedings, depending on the court procedure of 
the lex arbitri. Singapore’s Rules of Court contains provisions for the amendment of an 
originating motion (under Order 20), which allows amendments incorporating only new grounds 
that arise out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as the grounds originally specified. 
Only one of the six grounds satisfied this criterion.118 
 
3. Discovery and Arbitration 
 
What are the circumstances in which the court may grant or refuse discovery to a party to an 
arbitration agreement and is there a difference between pre-action and pre-arbitral discovery? 
The Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider that question relating to civil procedure 
and arbitration proceedings in the case of Woh Hup (Pte) Ltd and Others v Lian Teck Construction Pte 
Ltd.119 In this case, the respondent commenced proceedings in the court and also sought pre-
action discovery against the appellants. The appellants appealed to the High Court on the 
grounds that the matter was within the scope of an arbitration clause between the parties and 
that the court had no power to grant pre-arbitral discovery. The appellant’s appeal was, however, 
dismissed as the respondent clearly demonstrated its intention to bring the case before the 
courts and as such the application for discovery was a pre-action discovery within the discretion 
of the judge to grant or refuse. 
 
The court held that the term “pre-arbitral discovery” should be restricted to discovery sought 
before the commencement of arbitral proceedings per se. Thus, any discovery sought before the 
commencement of legal proceedings and for its purposes, whether or not it was sought by a 
party to an arbitration agreement, should still be termed “pre-action discovery”. The appellants’ 
contentions that the application was for pre-arbitral discovery were rejected as the fact that the 
respondent intended to sue the appellants in court had been expressly stated on affidavit. Thus, 
the respondent’s application was ultimately for pre-action discovery.120 
 
The court also held that it was not appropriate to consider the applicability of an arbitration 
clause at the hearing of a discovery application. The appropriate time to do so would be when a 
party commences an action, which the other party could object to on the basis that it involved a 
matter that was the subject of an arbitration agreement. It would then be for the court to grant 
                                                  
117 [2003] 3 Sing.L.R. 546. 
118 In this case, the judge also noted that the setting aside of an arbitral award under Order 69A was not 
equivalent to an appeal. 
119 [2005] SGCA 26. 
120 Ibid. at paras. 21 and 26. 
or to refuse a stay of proceedings.121 A party to an arbitration agreement could still apply to the 
court for pre-action discovery prior to commencing legal proceedings, and the court had 
jurisdiction to hear and grant such an application.122 However, to ensure that there would be no 
abuse or indiscriminate application, where there is likelihood that the matter was the subject of 
an arbitration agreement, the court could exercise its discretion by refusing to grant discovery.123 
The test for this was whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case and upon a plain literal 
reading of the arbitration provision, the scope of the arbitration agreement prima facie applied to 
the case before it.124 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
The law in this area will continue to evolve through legislative amendments, new or amended 
institutional rules and the continuous flow of cases where litigants bring arbitration- related 
issues before the courts. It is envisioned that Singapore’s own body of arbitration laws will 
mature, aiding in its development as a hub for dispute resolution for both domestic and 
international parties. This is not the beginning, but rather the middle of the journey towards a 
more mature arbitral forum and jurisdiction. 
 
                                                  
121 Ibid. at para. 32. 
122 Ibid. at para. 33. The court noted that an arbitration clause does not operate as a bar to commencing legal 
proceedings as parties may not have agreed to oust the court’s jurisdiction, citing the decision of the court in 
Australian Timber Products Pte Ltd v Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte) Ltd [2005] 
1 Sing.L.R. 168 at 172. 
123 It would have been good if the court had the opportunity to clarify the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to 
order pre-arbitral discovery. Nevertheless, it expressed doubt, albeit obiter, that that was so [ibid. at para. 36]. 
124 Ibid. at paras. 34 to 35. 
